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Area coverage of large-scale marine protected areas (MPAs) (LSMPAs, > 100,000 km2)
is rapidly increasing globally. Their effectiveness largely depends on successful detection
and management of non-compliance. However, for LSMPAs this can be difficult due to
their large size, often remote locations and a lack of understanding of the social drivers
of non-compliance. Taking a case-study approach, we review current knowledge of
illegal fishing within the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) LSMPA. Data stemming
from enforcement reports (2010–20), and from fieldwork in fishing communities (2018–
19) were combined to explore and characterise drivers of non-compliance. Enforcement
data included vessel investigation reports (n = 188), transcripts of arrests (20) and
catch seizures (58). Fieldwork data included fisher interviews (95) and focus groups
(12), conducted in two communities in Sri Lanka previously associated with non-
compliance in BIOT LSMPA. From 2010 to 2020, there were 126 vessels suspected
of non-compliance, 76% of which were Sri Lankan. The majority of non-compliant
vessels targeted sharks (97%), catching an estimated 14,340 individuals during the
study period. Sri Lankan vessels were primarily registered to one district (77%) and 85%
operated from just two ports within the fieldwork sites. Social Network Analysis (SNA)
showed that 66% of non-compliant vessels were linked by social ties, including sharing
crew members, compared with only 34% of compliant vessels. Thematic analysis of
qualitative data suggested that perceptions of higher populations of sharks and social
ties between vessels may both be important drivers. We discuss our findings within a
global context to identify potential solutions for LSMPA management.
Keywords: illegal fishing, marine protected area, non-compliance, sharks, social network analysis, deterrence,
enforcement
INTRODUCTION
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are recognised as a key tool for conserving the ocean (Wilhelm
et al., 2014). By limiting anthropogenic activities, particularly in areas of high global ecological
importance, they are capable of considerable conservation benefits (Edgar et al., 2014; Baskett and
Barnett, 2015). Accordingly, area coverage has rapidly increased globally, substantially bolstered
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by the designation of large-scale marine protected areas
(LSMPAs, > 100,000 km2), which are often located in remote
areas (Toonen et al., 2013; O’Leary et al., 2018). Attaining the
intended conservation targets for all MPAs is, however, highly
reliant on human compliance with policy and management. One
example of non-compliance that is well-documented for many
MPAs globally is illegal fishing (Carr et al., 2013; Arias et al., 2016;
Tickler et al., 2019; González-Andrés et al., 2020).
Characterising non-compliance with MPA measures,
including restrictions on fishing, is key for assessing MPA
success (Read et al., 2015). Understanding the social context of
non-compliance can inform managers about the effectiveness
of monitoring and enforcement strategies in deterring non-
compliance (Arias, 2015; Arias et al., 2015). It can also be
fundamental in ensuring management is capable of anticipating
and adapting to non-compliance events, rather than simply
reacting to them (Keane et al., 2008; Travers et al., 2019a).
Globally, whilst an increasing number of studies consider the
magnitude and nature of non-compliance for MPAs, there
remains a paucity of empirical research establishing the key
social drivers for illegal fishing, particularly for LSMPAs.
Drivers for illegal fishing are often highly context-specific
and inherently complex due to the nature of human behaviour
(Travers et al., 2019b). A strong economic component is
often assumed, which implies that the key objective of the
individual fisher is to maximise their individual profits, e.g., by
targeting catch of the highest worth (Schmidt, 2005; Le Gallic
and Cox, 2006). Accordingly, when deciding to fish illegally,
fishers are primarily concerned with weighing up the risk and
costs associated with detection, and the potential implications
of sanctions, against the expected benefits, making decisions
heuristically (Kahler et al., 2013; Battista et al., 2018; González-
Andrés et al., 2020). Perpetrators of illegal fishing are also
often assumed to have few alternative livelihood options, or
be subject to poverty (Duffy et al., 2016). It is increasingly
acknowledged, however, that non-compliant behaviours are
probably more widely motivated by multiple social factors,
including, but not limited to, personal habits, traditional skills
or expertise (Mancini et al., 2011), and feelings of trust and
legitimacy concerning governance and management (Sundström,
2012; Turner et al., 2016). In addition, it is understood that
factors may influence individual fishers differently due to unique
behavioural or psychological traits, such as attitudes to risk-
taking (Peterson et al., 2017; Battista et al., 2018). Therefore,
solely relying on enforcement-led deterrence, often primarily
based on economic factors, can fail to identify and mitigate
nuanced drivers of non-compliance (Challender and MacMillan,
2014; Challender et al., 2015).
The influence of social factors on non-compliance can be
moderated by social networks of resource users (Barnes et al.,
2016). Social ties between fishers can influence behaviour through
transmission of information, termed as bridging ties, or by
increased feelings of trust and transfer of social norms, termed
as bonding ties (Alexander et al., 2015). Both direct and indirect
social ties guide individuals in how to interpret social norms,
such as the acceptability of non-compliant behaviours, within
their community (Arias and Sutton, 2013; Battista et al., 2018).
Accordingly, influence of social networks on MPA policy and
management is increasingly well-documented (Cohen et al.,
2012; Alexander and Armitage, 2015; Alexander et al., 2015).
However, information about the influence of social dimensions,
including the role of social networks, on non-compliance in
remote LSMPAs is extremely limited (Gruby et al., 2016;
Gray et al., 2017).
Gathering sufficient understanding of social drivers for non-
compliance can, however, be particularly challenging in the case
of LSMPAs. Logistically, detecting incursions and enforcing MPA
policy is often challenging due to the considerable resources
needed to effectively patrol such large areas (Toonen et al.,
2013; Wilhelm et al., 2014). In addition, many LSMPAs surround
sovereignties that have minimal or no resident populations with
the main threat of non-compliance originating from foreign fleets
(Jones and De Santo, 2016). Policy-makers may have a limited
understanding of the social context and perceptions of these
foreign fleets (Gruby et al., 2016), making it difficult to adapt
MPA policy to social drivers, an important element of mitigating
non-compliance (Petrossian, 2015). In addition, it will be harder
for policy-makers to adopt alternative approaches that act to
influence social norms, such as environmental stewardship and
peer pressure, for foreign fleets which they may have minimal
engagement with (Arias et al., 2016).
Here, we aim to characterise illegal fishing in a remote
LSMPA in the central Indian Ocean, the British Indian Ocean
Territory (BIOT), where non-compliance from foreign fleets
has persisted since MPA creation in 2010. We address the
paucity and inconsistency in available data by combining
data from enforcement records with that from fieldwork in
Sri Lankan fishing communities known to illegally target the
MPA. Firstly, we reviewed current knowledge of illegal activity,
including reporting of vessel catch seizures. Secondly, we
explored characteristics of non-compliant vessels and fishers,
including assessing presence of social ties between fishers using
Social Network Analysis (SNA). Finally, we identified factors
influencing illegal fishing at a local and national level, by
combining qualitative enforcement and community data through
thematic analysis. By discussing study findings within the context
of current and potential MPA policy, we highlight the importance
of combining multiple data sources to gain a holistic insight into
the drivers for illegal fishing to manage LSMPAs globally.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study Location and Historical Context
Our study focuses on the BIOT MPA, one of the world’s largest
no-take MPAs with an area of 640,000km2 (Hays et al., 2020).
Located in the Central Indian Ocean, it comprises the islands
and atolls of the Chagos Archipelago and since 1973 there
has been no resident population, although ∼3,000 individuals
support a joint UK and US military base located on the largest
island, Diego Garcia (Hays et al., 2020). The MPA is considered
of global conservation importance and contains a wealth of
biodiversity, including highly vulnerable and endemic marine
species (Koldewey et al., 2010; Sheppard et al., 2012). Designated
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in April 2010, it is a strictly no-take MPA, with no commercial
fishing permitted. However, illegal fishing remains a persistent
challenge (Martin et al., 2013; Ferretti et al., 2018; Tickler
et al., 2019). Non-compliant vessels predominantly stem from
the semi-industrial “multi-day” fleet of Sri Lanka, that operate
medium-sized (9–15 m) vessels targeting large pelagics such as
tuna (Collins et al., 2020), although those fishing illegally in BIOT
are thought to primarily target sharks (Moir-Clark et al., 2015).
The prevalence of illegal vessels has been previously estimated at
20–120 vessels per annum (Price et al., 2009; Ferretti et al., 2018).
Enforcement patrols of the MPA are conducted by the BIOT
Patrol Vessel (BPV) and coordinated by a Senior Fisheries
Protection Officer (SFPO), who is employed by MRAG Ltd
under contract by the BIOT Administration (BIOTA) of Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development Office. Annual activity of the
BPV varies in response to perceived spatiotemporal risk of non-
compliance, as well as the fulfilment of other services within
the MPA, including scientific research support (Jacoby et al.,
2020). Once a vessel is sighted in the MPA, an investigation
into the nature of its behaviour occurs, typically by boarding
of the vessel by the SFPO and crew from the BPV. If sufficient
evidence of non-compliance has been collected, sanctions will
be pursued, most recently by reporting the vessel to the
competent authority of their home country for applications of
fines and/or licence revocation (see Supplementary Table 1 for
MPA associated policies).
Study Approach
Our study is primarily based on records produced by personnel
engaged in monitoring and patrolling the MPA from 2010 to
August 2020. All records were supplied by MRAG Ltd, with
permission from BIOTA. Primary data types used were reports
of boarding of vessels (herein “boarding reports”), transcripts of
arrests of fishers (herein “arrest transcripts”) and catch seizures.
Enforcement procedures and reporting format changed during
the study period and, consequently, the availability of these
records and the detail contained within them was highly variable
(see Supplementary Table 2 for full description of data types
and availability). Findings from these records (herein referred to
as “enforcement data”) were contextualised with qualitative data
collected during fieldwork in Sri Lankan fishing communities
from 2018 to 2019 (herein referred to as “community data”).
This fieldwork was conducted as part of wider research aimed
at understanding social drivers for non-compliant shark fishing,
and the specific methods used included focus groups (as
described in Collins et al., 2020) and semi-structured interviews
(Collins et al., 2021; see Supplementary Table 2). All fieldwork
was conducted, and the use of all data was approved, under
ethical permit from the University of Exeter (Ref: eCORN001727
v4.1). Enforcement data and community data were combined
together, as represented in Figure 1, and the results of both are
presented together throughout the results section. Enforcement
data, however, were primarily used to report spatiotemporal
occurrence, illegal resource use and extract key characteristics
of vessels.
Vessels suspected or confirmed of illegal fishing (herein
referred to as “non-compliant”) from 2010 to 2020 stemmed
from three countries overall (n = 128 vessels). As 76% (n = 97
vessels) of these were Sri Lankan, this study primarily focuses
on this fleet, although vessels from all countries were included
for analysis of number and location of illegal events and illegal
resource use. Due to the sensitivity of data, any identifying
features (e.g., names of fishers, vessels and harbours) have been
anonymised throughout. Sensitivities around MPA management
and enforcement also prevent analysis and publication of some
related data, such as the number of patrol hours, and patrolling
effort distribution. This means ascertaining trends in terms of
spatiotemporal distribution and magnitude of noncompliance is
beyond the scope of this study. Further, we note that decisions to
fish illegally by vessel crew may not be taken independently and
may be influenced by other actors within fisheries supply chain,
however identifying relative influence of different actors is mostly
beyond the remit of this study.
Data Processing
Vessel Characteristics
In order to process enforcement data, an entry record was
created for each vessel and georeferenced to the location of
initial sighting. As not all vessels investigated within BIOT
are suspected of non-compliance, each vessel was placed into
one of three categories according to their behaviour within the
MPA, as follows;
(1) Compliant vessel; investigation uncovers no evidence of
non-compliance and vessels are deemed as legally transiting
through the MPA, e.g., to reach fishing grounds beyond the
MPA
(2) Non-compliant vessel (suspected); investigation uncovers
evidence of non-compliance, but insufficient to pursue
sanctions. For example, a vessel appears to be exhibiting
behaviours typical of fishing activity, such as drifting in
known fishing areas or sighted near abandoned fishing
equipment, but it is not possible to ascertain whether fish
in the hold could have been caught in the MPA
(3) Non-compliant vessel (confirmed); investigation uncovers
enough evidence of non-compliance for the vessel
to be detained and/or sanctions levied by the flag
state of the vessel.
Note that categories two and three (suspected and confirmed
non-compliance) are grouped together as “non-compliant
vessels” for the purposes of analysis.
For each vessel, we extracted data on key characteristics,
such as vessel target species, vessel home port, and whether
the vessel was compliant with national fishing regulations (see
Supplementary Table 2 for a full list of characteristics). In
order to assess whether a vessel was targeting sharks, we took
into account presence of specialised gear equipment, notably
the presence of wire trace to strengthen long lines, fishers own
testimony and the composition of catch onboard. To address
inconsistencies in the format and availability of enforcement data,
this process utilised all available data types (e.g., a combination of
arrest transcripts and boarding reports).
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FIGURE 1 | Workflow schematic showing individual steps involved in data collection and processing to characterise and identify drivers for non-compliance in
the MPA.
In order to identify social ties between vessels, a descriptive
approach was adopted (Alexander and Armitage, 2015).
Qualitative data, including fishers’ own testimonies, contained
within enforcement data were used to identify ties at the
vessel level. Ties were coded against one of four categories that
represented all forms of identified ties (as described in Table 1).
Adopting this approach means social ties are unverifiable, due to
the reliance on pre-existing data, and that it is likely additional
ties would be discovered with further research.
Catch Data
During the study period, catch data was only available for 58
vessels, primarily due to differences in enforcement protocols and
time constraints. In addition, recording format varied and catch
was recorded using either specimen number or specimen weight
and, in some cases, either a mix of the two or both were used
(see Supplementary Table 3 for available catch data). Number
of specimens was used more consistently than the weight of
specimens (available for 32% and 23% of non-compliant vessels,
respectively). Taxonomic identification was also not always
possible and catch was reported to different phylogenetic levels.
Therefore, we categorised catch against four main high-level
taxonomic groups, namely, “reef fish,” “elasmobranch,” “tuna and
billfish species,” and “other” (see Supplementary Table 4 for a
list of identified species and associated categories). In order to
reconstruct catches for these 58 vessels, the average weight of
specimens in the reef fish [2.2 − 0.6 SEM (Standard error of the
Mean) kg] and elasmobranch (17.4 − 5 SEM kg) categories were
then calculated using data from vessels where both weight and
catch was present. Only reef fish and elasmobranch categories
were reconstructed as they accounted for 94% of all catch (in
terms of weight). Finally, in order to provide overall estimates
for catch of all non-compliant vessels during the study period,
we calculated average catches for vessels, according to their
country of origin. By assuming catches are representative, we then
multiplied these averages by the total vessel number per country
of origin during the study period to obtain estimated total catch.
Data Analysis
Social Network Analysis
Social networks of fishers were constructed with nodes
representing individual vessels, and edges (or links) between
vessels assigned based on social ties discovered in data (hereafter
“ties”). The network was unweighted, although edges comprise
the four different categories of ties defined in Table 1. No
analytical assumption was made regarding the relative strength
of ties, which were undirected. Using the igraph package (Csardi
and Nepusz, 2006) in R (R Core Team, 2018), networks of
social ties were then visualised and the network metric degree
centrality–a measure of number of individual ties held by each
vessel–was extracted to explore individual connectivity and
identify influential vessels (Mbaru and Barnes, 2017). Degree
centrality was also used to compare average ties for compliant and
non-compliant vessels.
Thematic Analysis
In order to identify themes in qualitative data, we chose an
open, inductive approach to thematic analysis (Auerbach and
Silverstein, 2003). Once all data were compiled, we conducted
open-coding analysis, a process by which thematic codes are
generated by identifying themes based entirely on the data (Miles
et al., 1994). We specifically looked for themes in the data
relating to the magnitude of illegal fishing and the possible
underlying social drivers. Initial codes were generated during
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TABLE 1 | Categories of social ties used for analysis of fisher social networks.
Type Description Illustrative evidence
Coordinated fishing Vessels that had fished together during current
trip
During boarding of the vessel, crew explained they had been fishing
with another (named) vessel
Vessel company Vessels part of a group owned by the same
owner
Owner name and address taken during investigation matches or owner
name and address taken from the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
(IOTC) record of active vessels matches
Crew ties Crew members recorded on different vessels
(typically captain of the vessel)
Captain name and date of birth (taken during investigation) matches
another vessel record
Coordinated supplies Vessels that had swapped supplies during
current trip
During boarding of the vessel, crew explained they had swapped
supplies with another (named vessel)
Categories were defined based upon information within enforcement data.
familiarisation with the data, and organised as headings and
related sub-headings in a hierarchical framework structure. Data
were then re-read and codes re-organised and arranged in an
iterative process until we were satisfied data saturation had been
reached (where no new meaning or interpretation can be gleaned
from continuing data analysis) (Bryman, 2016). All qualitative
enforcement and community data were coded in this manner and
this process was assisted by NVivo software (Nvivo, 2018). The
final framework is included in Supplementary Table 5, including
illustrative quotes to represent origin and content of data coded
against each theme. We acknowledge the likely inclusion of
response bias, where information provided may be adapted or
falsified by the study participants to look more desirable (Arias
and Sutton, 2013), in data sources used for this study, particularly
arrest transcripts. Therefore, all possible attempts to verify drivers
of non-compliance were made, e.g., by comparing findings from
across all data used in this study, but findings of data analysis
should be considered exploratory in nature.
RESULTS
Description of Non-compliance
Overall, there were 227 vessel investigations from 2010 to August
2020. Of these, 56% (n = 128 vessels) were non-compliant.
Sightings near the shallow reef areas at the centre of the
MPA were mostly non-compliant, whereas vessels sighted in
the north of the MPA in close proximity to typical transit
routes were mostly compliant (Figure 2A). Vessels from 13
countries were sighted, however, only vessels from Sri Lanka
(n = 97) (Figure 2B), India (n = 29), and Taiwan (n = 2)
were non-compliant (Figure 2C). Non-compliant Sri Lankan
vessels were the most common overall (76%), although from
2014 onwards, Indian vessels increased, representing 39, 50,
and 76% of non-compliant vessels in 2014, 2015, and 2016,
respectively (Figure 2C).
Numbers of non-compliant vessel investigations were highest
in 2010, 2014, and 2015 and within the months of May (n = 20),
October (n = 19), and December (n = 18) (Figure 2D). During
interviews within communities, fishers said travel to the MPA
during the south west monsoon period, typically during June to
July, was dangerous and identified December to May as the best
time to visit the MPA.
Illegal Resource Extraction
Catch data was recorded, in some form, for 45% (n = 44) of
the non-compliant Sri Lankan vessels and 48% (n = 14) of non-
compliant Indian vessels. For Sri Lankan vessels, average catch
consisted of 129 (SD: 140) elasmobranchs and 8 (SD: 21) reef fish
and for Indian vessels, 1862 (SD: 2113) reef fish and 63 (SD: 101)
elasmobranchs (Figure 3).
Assuming estimates are representative of non-compliant
vessels from each country, the estimated total elasmobranch
catch for all non-compliant Sri Lankan (n = 97) and Indian
vessels (n = 29) was 12,513 and 1,827 specimens, respectively
(total = 14,340). Total reef fish catch were estimated for
Sri Lankan and Indian vessels as 776 and 53,998 specimens,
respectively (total = 54,774). Catches regularly contained
species of conservation concern, such as oceanic whitetip
(Carcharhinus longimanus) and scalloped hammerhead (Sphyrna
lewini) sharks which are both Critically Endangered1. Shark
fins and manta gills were both found drying on vessels,
however, community data strongly suggests that neither shark
nor manta bodies are discarded at sea due to the high value of
their meat.
Case Study: Non-compliance of the
Sri Lankan Fleet
Characteristics of Vessels and Fishers
From 2010 to 2020, 153 vessels flagged to Sri Lanka were
investigated to ascertain compliance within MPA policy. Of
these, 36% (n = 54) were compliant, and 64% (n = 99) were
non-compliant. Data availability for vessel characteristics varied
(number of vessels for which data was available is stipulated
as n here). The most common gear type (n = 123) was a
combination of long-lines and gill-nets together (69%, n = 85)
followed by long-lines only (29%, n = 36) and nets only (1%,
n = 1) Size of vessels (n = 20) averaged 14.8 m (SD: 3.5, range:
12.4–16.1) and crew size (n = 98) averaged 6 persons (SD: 1,
range = 4–8). Identified target species (n = 123) included tuna
and other large pelagics such as marlin, and 73% (n = 91) reported
targeting sharks.
There were notable differences between characteristics of
compliant and non-compliant vessels. Firstly, non-compliant
vessels (n = 82) were primarily (93%) operating both long-line
1https://www.iucnredlist.org/
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FIGURE 2 | Spatial distribution of vessel sightings (n = 227) shown using a heatmap distribution, with sightings for compliant vessels (red) and non-compliant
vessels (blue) shown (A). Picture of a Sri Lankan vessel typical to those seen in the MPA, taken in Sri Lankan waters. Image courtesy of AV (B). Number of
non-compliant vessels on an annual basis, with vessel flag state (fill) shown (C), IND = India, LKA = Sri Lanka, TWN = Taiwan. Number of vessel investigations during
the study period, on a monthly basis (D).
and gill-nets and, in comparison, compliant vessels (n = 40)
were commonly (79%) operating long-lines only. Differences in
target species were also noted, as non-compliant vessels (n = 88)
were primarily (97%) targeting sharks, compared to only 14% of
compliant vessels (n = 36). Wire trace, a specialised equipment
which strengthens long-lines for catching sharks, was also seen
on 97% of non-compliant vessels (n = 73), compared to only 12%
(n = 4) of compliant vessels (n = 33). Spatial data shows vessels
targeting sharks are primarily sighted near shallow, reef areas
located in the centre of the MPA (Figure 4).
Non-compliance with national regulations (including
presence of a functioning Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and
possession of a valid high seas licence) was more common in
non-compliant vessels. Compliant vessels also more commonly
held an active registration on the IOTC active vessel list. Other
regulatory issues included absent or incomplete logbooks and
three captains without a valid fishing licence.
Vessels were primarily registered to districts in the south
west of Sri Lanka, although there was a noted difference
between compliant and non-compliant vessels (Figure 5). Non-
compliant vessels were primarily (77%) registered to one district
on the west coast and further analysis suggests that 85%
operate from one port (Supplementary Figure 1). Similarly,
72% of compliant vessels came from two ports located on the
west coast.
Data suggested only a small minority (∼5%) of non-compliant
vessels, were repeatedly non-compliant (maximum number of
investigations per vessel = 4). However, evidence suggested
that repeated non-compliance may go undetected. For example,
active IOTC registration numbers were available for only 28%
of non-compliant vessels (n = 28), however, we found three
IOTC numbers that were registered to different vessel names
throughout the study period. Therefore, relying on vessel
names to detect repeated non-compliance likely underestimates
repeated non-compliance. In accordance, community data
showed fishers perceive some vessels are repeatedly non-
compliant. This is exemplified by one fisher, who said “it depends.
The number of trips by other vessels may differ from us. We
normally go 4 or 5 times a year. Don’t know about others.”
At the individual fisher level, four fishers were confirmed
as repeatedly non-compliant during the study period, doing so
on two, three, or seven different vessels. One fisher detained
in 2011 also admitted to fishing in the MPA on two previous
occasions. Evidence from community data also suggested fishers
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FIGURE 3 | Catches of sharks (A) and reef fish (C) for all non-compliant vessels where catch data was available (58 vessels) according to year of investigation.
Catches of Sri Lankan vessels are shown in yellow and for Indian vessels in grey. Images of catch seizures from non-compliant vessels, courtesy of MRAG (B,D).
may be repeatedly non-compliant, independent of perceived
risks. For example, one interviewed fisher said “because they are
irresponsible, without considering the rules and regulations and
punishments they just cross the borders and fish there.”
Drivers of Illegal Fishing
Economic benefits from non-compliance
Perceptions of higher populations of fish within the MPA, due to
overcapacity and overfishing in traditional fishing areas, emerged
as a key theme influencing non-compliance from enforcement
data. One fisher stated “we have no fish in our sea areas and also
we have limited space. So we have to go to other territories to catch
fish.” Shark populations, specifically, appeared to be a key driver.
In arrest transcripts, 50% of fishers mentioned sharks, including
explaining that populations of sharks were higher in the MPA
than in traditional fishing areas. One fisher explained “the fishing
for sharks in Sri Lanka is poor.”
Community data showed fishers associated high relative
catches of sharks with non-compliance in the MPA. During
interviews, one fisher opined “at Garcia (BIOT), you’ll catch 100%
sharks. . .we have to go to Garcia or Seychelles if we want to catch
sharks,” and another stated “there is a specific group who mainly
target sharks. It’s like 10%, very few. They may go 2–3 times
FIGURE 4 | Location of investigated vessels coloured according to whether
they were found to be targeting sharks (blue) or not (yellow).
a year for other countries waters.” Other evidence taken from
interviews suggest that fishers perceive non-compliant vessels
to earn high annual incomes, much higher than for compliant
vessels, due to these large shark catches. Fishers further explained
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FIGURE 5 | District of origin for Sri Lankan vessels sighted in the MPA taken from vessel registration details gathered from enforcement data. Compliant vessels (left)
and non-compliant vessels are shown (right). Registration details were available for 138 vessels sighted from 2010 to 2020.
that sharks fetch a higher price more consistently than other
target species, which are more subject to market fluctuations.
Fishers also explained that sharks can be stored for longer than
other species without decomposing, supported by one fisher who
stated “(they) use lesser ice, so we can store sharks for long.” This
would make them suitable for the long fishing trips of vessels,
and their reliance on ice for cold storage only. Both enforcement
and community data showed, however, that these views are not
ubiquitous across all Sri Lankan fishers. Within enforcement
data, compliant fishers stated that shark prices had fallen and
that targeting other species is more profitable. Similarly, during
interviews within the communities, some fishers explained that
they didn’t target sharks for similar reasons, preferring to target
tuna or billfish.
Economic costs of non-compliance
Community data showed fishers hold variable perceptions of the
risk of being detected whilst engaging in non-compliance within
the MPA (from 0 to 100% chance of detection). This disparity
is highlighted by the following quotes from separate fishers, of
“they arrest us as soon as we arrive,” compared with “no, only 1
or 2% get caught.” Detection risk appeared to be moderated by
avoidance strategies, including turning off VMS or only fishing
at night. Interestingly, enforcement data showed that six vessels
were investigated multiple times during the same fishing trips, as
they failed to leave the MPA following the initial investigation.
Whether this is due to low perceived risk of repeated detection or
sanctions is unclear.
Knowledge of sanctions for non-compliance were equally
variable. During interviews, fishers said the levels of fines ranged
from $0 to $15,000 upon arrest and detention periods from 1
month to 3 years. Overall, there was a broad consensus that
regulations, including mandatory VMS, had increased detection
risk, and one fisher said “now because of the VMS technology
they can’t go.” In addition, some interviewed fishers stated these
regulations had stopped them illegally fishing in the MPA over
the last 5–10 years.
Socio-cultural factors
During interviews, some fishers said that fishing in BIOT and
other EEZs was associated with tradition, saying “there are older
generation people who are used to go there since old times” or
“the people who go as a habit, don’t get fear to go frequently.” We
also identified mixed views within fishing communities on the
legitimacy of MPAs as a form of fisheries management, with some
claiming they had experienced their benefits, whereas others
held negative views.
Social network analysis
Using available enforcement data, we identified social ties (of
any category) for 45% (n = 60) of all Sri Lankan vessels. The
majority of non-compliant vessels (66%, n = 55) had at least one
social tie compared to 34% (n = 16) of compliant vessels. Average
localised degree centrality was 1.3 (SD: 1.6, range: 0–7) for
non-compliant vessels and 0.3 (±0.5, range: 0–2) for compliant
vessels, suggestive of a more integrated network of social contact.
Network visualisation shows clustering of ties for non-compliant
vessel groups (Figure 6). However, there was considerable range
in degree centrality scores, with no ties identified for some non-
compliant vessels (Supplementary Figure 2).
Ties were mostly between non-compliant vessels, with only
four ties between non-compliant and compliant vessels identified.
Ties due to vessels being owned by the same company were the
most commonly identified (Table 2). Data highlighted different
potential ways in which social ties could be influencing behaviour
at both the individual fisher and vessel level (Table 2).
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FIGURE 6 | Identified social ties between vessels, coloured according to
category. All compliant (light grey) and non-compliant vessels (dark grey) are
represented as nodes, and displayed size is proportional to degree centrality
(number of social ties per vessel).
Insights from both community and enforcement data
highlighted the potential importance of social transmission
of information in influencing where fishers decided to fish.
Fishers explained that coordinates within the MPA had been
recommended to them by other fishers at their home port.
This is exemplified by the following quotes taken from arrest
transcripts “the information was given to them (by a) fisherman.
That’s why they don’t know this area” and “one friend they
make big. . .last time, he said you come this position you find a
lot of fish.” Community data suggested information exchanged
between fishers during trips, over radios, may also be important
in influencing behaviour, with one fisher stating, “what happens
most of the time is fishermen follow information they get
through radio communications.” During vessel boarding, radios
of multiple vessels were identified as tuned to the same frequency,
possibly as a means to reduce detection risk. This was supported
by one fisher, who said “we stay in contact with other fishers using
radio, if someone sees the surveillance vessel we just elope leaving
all our gear and stuff.” Although fishers discussed sharing fishing
information, coordinated fishing was only seen between small
numbers of vessels, and one fisher explained that this was due to
detection risk, stating “one or two cross borders, we can come out
safely without being noticed.”
DISCUSSION
Our findings demonstrate how detailed study of enforcement
data, particularly when combined with other data sources,
can identify potential social drivers for illegal fishing, even
when data appears limited (Gavin et al., 2010; Bergseth
et al., 2015, 2017). These results highlight the importance
of considering social dimensions, including social networks,
in explaining human behavioural reactions to MPA policy,
particularly for remote LSMPAs where they are often overlooked
(Gruby et al., 2016). Our findings stimulate discussion around
how to achieve a balance in MPA management between
enforcement-based activities designed to deter perpetrators,
and alternative approaches, including education-based
programmes or incentive-based approaches (Holden et al.,
2018; Paudel et al., 2019).
Potential Impact of Non-compliance
We reaffirm that non-compliance represents a persistent threat
to the MPA (Ferretti et al., 2018; Hays et al., 2020). We identified
sharks as the primary target species of illegal vessels, providing
context for reported declines in reef shark species, of > 90%
since the 1970s (Anderson et al., 1998; Graham et al., 2010).
Our estimates suggest 14,340 sharks were caught by Sri Lankan
and Indian vessels suspected of illegal fishing from 2010 to
August 2020. Further, our data provides clear evidence that
total extraction was considerably higher, as fishers stated non-
compliance was frequently undetected during this time period.
Previous estimates suggest that from 1996 to 2015 from 1,745
to 23,195 sharks were caught annually (Ferretti et al., 2018).
This continued exploitation diminishes the ability of the MPA to
attain intended conservation benefits, including providing vital
refuge for shark species that are increasingly threatened with
extinction (Davidson and Dulvy, 2017; Letessier et al., 2019).
Previous research has shown that even short non-compliance
events threaten local populations of sharks within the MPA
(Tickler et al., 2019) and the concentration of non-compliance
in shallow reef areas likely greatly reduces the protection afforded
by the MPA for vital early life-history stages and reef-associated
species (Curnick et al., 2020; Jacoby et al., 2020). The impact on
local populations will be further exacerbated for multiple species
we identified in illegal catches that exhibit high site fidelity,
including silky sharks (Carlisle et al., 2019; Curnick et al., 2020).
Our results show the threat of non-compliance is inherently
dynamic in nature (Bergseth and Roscher, 2018). Indian vessels
were increasingly detected and investigated for non-compliance
from 2014 onwards. Indian vessels found within the MPA have
considerably larger holds (∼30,000 kg) than Sri Lankan vessels
TABLE 2 | Number of ties identified for each defined category with illustrative quotes to demonstrate data used to identify ties.
Social tie No. Illustrative quotes
Company 37 “there is one company all of his boats go there” or “our company has 8 boats targeting sharks in Seychelles and all 8 cross borders”
Crew 8 “he had been arrested 2 years ago and had been detained at Diego Garcia”
Coordinated fishing 23 “the two boats came together from Sri Lanka”
Supplies 5 “he said that there was another boat so he had (to give) some cigarettes to that boat”
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(<3,500 kg) (Amarasinghe, 2013). Due to these differences in
vessel capacity and variations in targeting behaviours, they may
pose a serious threat to BIOTs fish assemblages and, resultantly,
the resilience of the MPA to other anthropogenic threats such as
climate change (Anderson et al., 1998; Koldewey et al., 2010).
We suggest an urgent study is therefore needed within Indian
communities to verify magnitude and drivers of non-compliance
within the MPA for this fleet.
Drivers of Illegal Fishing
Adopting a descriptive approach, we identified key characteristics
shared by the majority of non-compliant vessels from Sri Lanka.
This included a preference for targeting sharks, which has
previously been identified as a driver of non-compliance within
MPAs elsewhere (Carr et al., 2013; González-Andrés et al., 2020).
In other contexts, illegal shark fishing has been associated with
a lack of alternative livelihoods (Jaiteh et al., 2017; Booth et al.,
2019) and to meet the basic needs of fishers subject to poverty
(MacKeracher et al., 2020). In this case, however, non-compliant
fishers appeared primarily motivated by a desire to earn higher
than average incomes. These findings highlight that associating
non-compliance with impoverished resource users acting to
meet basic economic needs may not fully explain the economic
aspects of non-compliance for all situations (Paudel et al., 2019).
Approaches to non-compliance, therefore, need to incorporate
multi-faceted understandings of economic motivations, such as
consumer demand, as well as aspects of poverty that aren’t purely
economic in nature, such as social mobility (Challender and
MacMillan, 2014; Duffy et al., 2016).
Decisions to not comply are made heuristically, and fishers
will incorporate likelihood of detection and sanctions in
deciding whether non-compliance will be beneficial (Nagin
et al., 2018), with a low probability of detection increasing
the likelihood of illegal fishing (Bergseth et al., 2017). Our
findings suggest fishers hold varied perceptions of sanctions
within the MPA. This is common in the absence of concerted
efforts to raise awareness within communities about fisheries
regulations and their purpose (Pollnac et al., 2010) and can
negate any influence of improving enforcement in reducing
deterrence (Holden et al., 2018). Studies have also shown that
perceived impact of sanctions will vary depending on fisher
social context (Arias and Sutton, 2013; Collins et al., 2020)
and according to behavioural attributes of fishers, such as
previous fishing experience (Battista et al., 2018). Interestingly,
we identified repeatedly non-compliant fishers from both
enforcement and community data, potentially indicating an
absence of significant deterrence for some fishers who may
have an increased propensity for illegal behaviours (Sutinen and
Kuperan, 1999). This highlights the need to engage in multi-
faceted interventions, rather than relying on deterrence alone
(Paudel et al., 2019).
The role of social networks in influencing outcomes of
conservation policy and management is increasingly recognised
(Bodin and Prell, 2011), including within the specific context of
MPAs (Fox et al., 2012; Alexander et al., 2015). Our approach
identified that non-compliant vessels may be more strongly
connected than compliant vessels and were clustered within three
dominant groups. Ascertaining the structure (e.g., directionality,
strength) or purpose (e.g., influence on behaviours) of ties
was mostly beyond the scope of this paper. However, our
findings provide initial evidence for the influence of social ties
within the context of non-compliance in LSMPAs, a poorly
researched topic. Social ties can influence perceived acceptability
of non-compliance (Arias and Sutton, 2013) and perceptions
(or observations) of non-compliance within groups can increase
propensity to engage in it (MacKeracher et al., 2020). Ties were
seen to facilitate information sharing between vessel groups,
seemingly facilitating illegal fishing practices, including reducing
detection risk. Although there was the suggestion of organisation
between small groups of vessels, there was no evidence of large-
scale organised crime that is often associated with illegal wildlife
trade within the conservation domain (Pires et al., 2016; Paudel
et al., 2019; Witbooi et al., 2020). Moving forwards, additional
research to identify structure, function and influence of networks
for non-compliance within LSMPAs, including BIOT, is required.
Future MPA Management
Studying illegal resource use is often constrained by inconsistent
data collection, and a lack of focus on social dimensions
(Gavin et al., 2010; Bergseth et al., 2015; Read et al., 2015).
We advocate for continued advances in consistent, systematic
collection of enforcement data within the MPA, which may
be facilitated by application of semi-automated systems such
as Spatial Monitoring And Reporting Tool (SMART2), which
can be particularly useful in resource-limited situations as
it offers a way to combine intelligence from different data
sources (Critchlow et al., 2017). In the case of BIOT, this
means intelligence from emerging technologies, such as remote
sensing of vessels, can be combined with intelligence collected
directly from perpetrators of wildlife crime within fishing
communities. The former is key, as it helps to understand
illegal activity across the MPA, addressing potential bias in
understanding of illegal activity which may be caused by
patrolling strategies. Collecting further data within fishing
communities is also key to further understand the social
context of fishers which is vital to ensure strategies to address
drivers of non-compliance are appropriate (St. John et al.,
2014; Arias, 2015; Nuno and St. John, 2015; Petrossian, 2015;
Paudel et al., 2019).
Primarily relying on economic-based deterrence for MPA
management and enforcement can be well-suited to situations
where monitoring and enforcement is highly effective in
detecting and enforcing sanctions. However, for BIOT, and other
LSMPAs located remotely, relying on such models may not be
feasible due to the substantial required investment (De Santo,
2013; Edgar et al., 2014). These models are also primarily based
on humans making decisions rationally, and for purely economic
reasons, which is often not the case (Challender and MacMillan,
2014; Duffy et al., 2016; Battista et al., 2018). Our results reaffirm
the need to adopt a nuanced approach to non-compliance,
potentially incorporating alternatives such as incentives for
2http://smartconservationtools.org
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compliance, which can address multi-faceted drivers of non-
compliance (Thomas-Walters et al., 2020). However, further
research is needed to understand the feasibility of such measures
in instances such as BIOT MPA, where non-compliance threat is
highly dynamic and originates from multiple foreign fleets.
Wider Context
Our findings support the need for sustained and systematic
advances in understanding of social dimensions for LSMPAs
on a global-scale (Christie et al., 2017; Gray et al., 2017).
Remote LSMPAs have been considered easy to implement
due to the absence of significant surrounding populations and
negligible social outcomes (Gruby et al., 2017). However, these
factors create a unique set of challenges which require careful
consideration. Firstly, as we have shown, even remote LSMPAs
have detectable social outcomes for surrounding regions, yet
they are mostly poorly conceptualised (Gruby et al., 2016; Gray
et al., 2017). Determining desired social outcomes for LSMPAs
is often complex, however, it is necessary to ensure MPA
management is aligned with wider regional policy frameworks
(Gruby et al., 2020). Secondly, if the threat of non-compliance
entirely originates from non-local fishers, adopting alternative
methods to encourage compliance, such as influencing social
norms, requires understanding and working with communities
that policy-makers are unlikely to be familiar with (Arias et al.,
2016). Accordingly, future successful management of LSMPAs,
including BIOT, relies on building beneficial, multilateral
regional partnerships with surrounding countries to mitigate the
mutually negative consequences of illegal fishing on MPA success
and fishing communities.
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